38 research outputs found
Foresighted Demand Side Management
We consider a smart grid with an independent system operator (ISO), and
distributed aggregators who have energy storage and purchase energy from the
ISO to serve its customers. All the entities in the system are foresighted:
each aggregator seeks to minimize its own long-term payments for energy
purchase and operational costs of energy storage by deciding how much energy to
buy from the ISO, and the ISO seeks to minimize the long-term total cost of the
system (e.g. energy generation costs and the aggregators' costs) by dispatching
the energy production among the generators. The decision making of the entities
is complicated for two reasons. First, the information is decentralized: the
ISO does not know the aggregators' states (i.e. their energy consumption
requests from customers and the amount of energy in their storage), and each
aggregator does not know the other aggregators' states or the ISO's state (i.e.
the energy generation costs and the status of the transmission lines). Second,
the coupling among the aggregators is unknown to them. Specifically, each
aggregator's energy purchase affects the price, and hence the payments of the
other aggregators. However, none of them knows how its decision influences the
price because the price is determined by the ISO based on its state. We propose
a design framework in which the ISO provides each aggregator with a conjectured
future price, and each aggregator distributively minimizes its own long-term
cost based on its conjectured price as well as its local information. The
proposed framework can achieve the social optimum despite being decentralized
and involving complex coupling among the various entities
Intervention in Power Control Games With Selfish Users
We study the power control problem in wireless ad hoc networks with selfish
users. Without incentive schemes, selfish users tend to transmit at their
maximum power levels, causing significant interference to each other. In this
paper, we study a class of incentive schemes based on intervention to induce
selfish users to transmit at desired power levels. An intervention scheme can
be implemented by introducing an intervention device that can monitor the power
levels of users and then transmit power to cause interference to users. We
mainly consider first-order intervention rules based on individual transmit
powers. We derive conditions on design parameters and the intervention
capability to achieve a desired outcome as a (unique) Nash equilibrium and
propose a dynamic adjustment process that the designer can use to guide users
and the intervention device to the desired outcome. The effect of using
intervention rules based on aggregate receive power is also analyzed. Our
results show that with perfect monitoring intervention schemes can be designed
to achieve any positive power profile while using interference from the
intervention device only as a threat. We also analyze the case of imperfect
monitoring and show that a performance loss can occur. Lastly, simulation
results are presented to illustrate the performance improvement from using
intervention rules and compare the performances of different intervention
rules.Comment: 33 pages, 6 figure